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I
THE PECULIAR ROLE OF AN ARBITRATOR
A proper definition of the appropriate roles of arbitrators, adminis-
trative agencies and the courts depends in great part on the notion that,
generally speaking, in labor relations, the interpretation and application
of contracts is for arbitrators, and the interpretation and application of
statutes is for the administrative agencies and the courts. Arbitrators
deal primarily with contract rights and administrative agencies, like the
NLRB and the courts, deal primarily with statutory rights. If that dis-
tinction is maintained, the problems of deferral to arbitration and the use
of external law in arbitration can be more easily resolved.
It is a fundamental notion that parties generally commission arbitra-
tors to read their contract and tell them what that contract means. Arbi-
trators are thus contractually empowered to provide the parties with a
definitive interpretation of their agreement. That idea is so basic that a
court, in reviewing an arbitral award, should treat it as if the parties
themselves had stipulated that this was their interpretation of their con-
tract. The notion that the arbitrator commits gross error in interpreting
the contract then becomes a contradiction in terms.
David Feller, in a brilliant article, suggested that the peculiar nature
of the arbitrator's role as interpreter of the collective bargaining agree-
t James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B., Fordham
College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954; Member, Board of Governors, National Academy
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ment arises from the fact that the arbitrator is really setting terms that
the parties could not have agreed upon because there are an infinite vari-
ety of situations unanticipated at the time the bargain is struck. 27 Feller
argues that collective bargaining agreements must, in fact, deal with
these situations, if not in actuality, then putatively.
The real explanation for the nature of the arbitral role is a simpler
one and applies to all arbitration agreements, whether labor arbitration
or nonlabor arbitration. My view is simply that the arbitrator, in the
labor context or otherwise, has this peculiar status because it is what the
parties have agreed to. The collective bargaining agreement states explic-
itly that the arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding. As the prece-
dents show, the answer is the same in commercial arbitration as it is in
labor arbitration.
II
APPLICATION OF EXTERNAL LAW IN ARBITRATION
A question regarding external law in arbitration arises in two ways:
in regard to the arbitrator's role, how the arbitrator should interpret the
contract insofar as it may be affected by external law; and in regard to
the court's role, how external law may apply to the enforcement of the
award if the award is contested and goes to court.
A. Arbitrators' Jurisdiction Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
The notion that the arbitrator's authority depends upon the com-
mission from the parties leads to the conclusion that ordinarily and theo-
retically the arbitrator is to apply the contract, not external law. The
leading Supreme Court case of United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp.,28 the last of the Steelworkers Trilogy, specifically states that
the arbitrator must not base her decision solely upon her view of the
requirements of enacted legislation. The arbitrator's interpretation, to be
valid, must "dra[w] . . . its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement."2 9
In disputes that have caused a great deal of theoretical turmoil
within the National Academy of Arbitrators and elsewhere over the
years, I have taken the position that that rule applies even if the arbitra-
tor concludes that the contract is in conflict with a statutory provision.3"
If there is a direct, irreconcilable conflict between the arbitrator's notion
of what the contract requires and her view of what a particular statute
27. Feller, The Remedy Power in Grievance Arbitration, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 128, 134-37 (1982).
28. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
29. Id. at 597.
30. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
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requires, the arbitrator should follow the contract because it is the con-
tract and not the law that the parties have asked the arbitrator to inter-
pret and apply.
Many arbitrators are not lawyers. The arbitrator's view of the law
may, in fact, be erroneous. The parties are asking for a reader of the
contract to tell them what the contract means. It is then up to the courts
to deal with the question of whether that reading is or is not in accord
with enacted legislation.
In practice, much of this great debate about contract versus law is a
tempest in a teapot, the importance of which may be exaggerated. First,
if the parties have used contractual language that directly tracks the lan-
guage of a statue, such as the National Labor Relations Act or the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, that contractual language must be interpreted as an
invitation to the arbitrator to read the contract in light of the statute.
The parties have undoubtedly intended that the contractual rights with
which they are dealing be analogous to the statutory rights. Therefore,
in this situation, the arbitrator may take account of administrative and
judicial decisions interpreting the statute as a guide to interpreting the
contractual rights.
Second, there is no reason why the parties cannot empower the arbi-
trator, either implicitly or explicitly, to take enacted legislation into ac-
count. In the majority of cases where the contractual language is subject
to two different readings-one which would be valid under the law and
one which would be struck down as invalid-an arbitrator is merely ex-
ercising common sense if she concludes that the contract should be read
in its valid sense.
Ultimately, however, the arbitrator's commission is grounded in the
collective bargaining agreement or the ad hoc stipulations of the parties
appointing her. Her authority can rise no higher than its source, the
agreement of the parties providing for that commission.
B. Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards
When a court reviews an arbitration award, the Supreme Court has
made it very clear over the years that the court should not concern itself
with the merits of the determination. If the arbitrator has acted within
her jurisdiction, has not been corrupt and has not denied the parties due
process, then the court should accept her reading as the definitive inter-
pretation of the contract even if the court might have read the contract
differently. Simply put, a court should not indulge in second-guessing. 31
This view has given rise over the last couple of years, however, to
some serious inquiries about what a court should do when it finds that
31. See 363 U.S. at 599; AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 106 S. Ct.
1415, 1419 (1986).
1988]
HeinOnline  -- 10 Indus. Rel. L.J. 20 1988-1989
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL
the arbitrator's reading of the contract is correct but that it conflicts with
certain public policy notions. Should the court set aside the award?
Although the court should bow to the interpretation that the arbitrator
has rendered, it is also the function of the court to make certain that the
enforcement of the arbitral award will not constitute a violation of law.
The issue that has emerged over the last few years in a series of
contested cases in the courts of appeals is the extent to which a court
should go beyond actual legislation or well-accepted principles of com-
mon law and indulge in its own notions of general public policy in deter-
mining the extent to which an arbitral award should be enforced.32 In a
case currently before the Supreme Court, Paperworkers v. Misco,33 the
Court may provide some insight into the resolution of this problem.
In Misco, an arbitrator's reinstatement of a worker discharged for
allegedly smoking marijuana was set aside by the court of appeals-after
rewriting the findings-on the ground that it was contrary to public pol-
icy to reinstate an employee who worked with dangerous machinery and
smoked marijuana on the job.34 It appears that the case will be reversed
on the facts. But more important is what the Supreme Court may decide
about the role of public policy notions in court review of arbitral awards.
In my judgment, the position the Court should follow is set forth in
the amicus curiae brief written on behalf of the National Academy of
Arbitrators by arbitration expert David Feller.35 In the brief, he argues
that a court should not indulge in general notions of public policy in
order to set aside an arbitration award; it is only when the award would
call for the violation of some clear statutory principle or some fundamen-
tal principle of common law that a court should step in. Whether people
should or should not be reinstated because they smoked marijuana is the
kind of question that should be left to arbitration; the court should not
engage in that kind of policymaking.36
There are number of court decisions which have taken the position
espoused in this brief-that it is better to narrow the range of review so
that courts will not indulge their own notions of public policy. Under
32. See S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178, 186-
87 (1st Cir. 1987); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 78 (D.C. Cir.
1987); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 615-17
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186 (1987).
33. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) (decided subsequent
to the Symposium).
34. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S.
Ct. 364.
35. National Academy of Arbitrators Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioners (No. 86-651).
36. Id. at 20-26. In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the circuit court cited no statu-
tory or case law which the worker's actions violated. The Court stated that a court reviewing an
arbitration award can refuse enforcement only when the award violates "existing laws and legal
precedents... establish[ing] a well-defined and dominant policy .... " 108 S. Ct. at 374 (quotation
omitted).
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this view, the role of the courts is limited to ensuring that the enforce-
ment of the award does not directly violate an accepted statutory princi-
ple or fundamental principle of common law.37
III
DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
The question of deferral to arbitration has two distinct aspects:
deferral to an award that has already been issued, and deferral to the
process prior to its being invoked. In both situations, a clear demarca-
tion between the arbitrator's contract-reading role and the NLRB's stat-
ute-interpreting roles can resolve the deferral problems.
A. Deferral to an Award
For many years, the National Labor Relations Board has held under
the Spielberg doctrine that it will recognize or honor an arbitration
award as long as the proceedings have been fair and regular, all the par-
ties have agreed to be bound, and the decision is not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act.38 It is troubling that the Spielberg
doctrine leads to the Labor Board's accepting an arbitration decision as a
determination of whether or not there was an unfair labor practice-a
question involving interpretation of statutory rights.
Rather, the Labor Board should recognize that what the arbitrator
is deciding is whether or not there was just cause for the discipline that
had been imposed under the contract. Of course, the Board may appro-
priately make use of that finding as to contract violation in making its
determination as to whether there was a statutory violation. An arbitral
finding of just cause for dismissal, for example, will be relevant to the
question of whether an employee actually was disciplined because she
engaged in a union activity. But in the one case it is a contractual issue,
and in the other case it is a statutory issue.
More recently in the Olin Corp. case, the Board added some refine-
ments to its doctrine, enlarging the scope of deferral. The Board estab-
lished a rule that the existence of parallelism between contractual and
statutory rights would be a sufficient basis for the Board to defer if the
arbitrator had been presented generally with the facts bearing on the un-
37. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983) (the public policy that would justify a court's refusal to enforce an arbitral award
"must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests' " (quoting Muschany v.
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945))); Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 78
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding arbitral reinstatement of alcoholic pilot); American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding arbitral award where
arbitrator excluded grievant's statements as a violation of Miranda rights).
38. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
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fair labor practice issue.39
The Board must realize that the same issue is technically not before
the arbitrator that is before the Board, because the arbitrator is dealing
solely with a contractual question. The Board should never abdicate its
fundamental function of dealing with the statutory question. In the fu-
ture, the courts must examine more closely the nature of the Board's
deferral actions.
B. Pre-A ward Deferral
The more difficult problem is the situation in which an employee has
filed a charge of antiunion discrimination with the Board against an em-
ployer' and the employer contends that the employee could have gone
through the grievance and arbitration procedure because the contract
also protects him against discrimination because of union activity.
Under this contention, the Board should defer to an arbitration of the
question."a
In the Collyer42 case, the Board first accepted the notion that it
would defer to arbitration where the charge was not one of individual
discrimination, but rather of a refusal to bargain, in a context where the
refusal to bargain was essentially a unilateral change of working condi-
tions. As the employer's actions were arguably in violation of the con-
tract, they were arguably subject to the grievance and arbitration
procedure. Rather than interpreting the contract itself, the Board de-
ferred to the arbitrator.
It is far more appropriate, in my view, to accept the deferral doc-
trine in a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain situation, because the essen-
tial issue in most of these cases is the meaning of the contract. An
arbitral review of whether the employer did engage in a unilateral change
examines the question of whether the employer violated some provision
39. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984). There may be some disagreement among the
courts of appeals concerning the NLRB's revised standards for deferring to arbitration awards.
Compare Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11 th Cir. 1986) (Board may not presume that all arbitral
proceedings confront and decide every possible unfair labor practice issue in bipartite grievance-
arbitration proceedings) with Bakery Workers Local 25 v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(apparently accepting new Olin Corp. standards for deferral when arbitrator has been "presented
generally" with facts relevant to resolving unfair labor practice).
40. The Spielberg postaward deferral doctrine has long been held applicable to cases arising
under both § 8(a)(3) (individual discrimination) and § 8(a)(5) (unilateral change/refusal to bargain)
of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (5)(1982)). See, e.g., Taylor, 786 F.2d 1516 (§ 8(a)(3)); Bakery
Workers, 730 F.2d 812 (§ 8(a)(5)).
41. Cf Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (employee's statutory right to a
trial de novo, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, could not be foreclosed by a prior
submission of his claim to final arbitration under the antidiscrimination clause of a collective bar-
gaining agreement).
42. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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in the contract with the action that it took. That is peculiarly subject to
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
The Board, however, has not developed a clear doctrine about this
kind of deferral. It has not recognized that the Collyer situation is not
the only kind of case in which a section 8(a)(5) can arise. Some of the
cases in which a section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge is filed after
unilateral action involve situations where the matter is not covered by the
contract at all; it may be a matter completely omitted from the contract.
Ordinarily, an arbitrator will find that the employer did not violate the
contract in that situation because there was no provision in the contract
preventing the employer from taking that particular action. The prob-
lem, however, is that it still may be a section 8(a)(5) violation. It may be
the taking of unilateral action with regard to a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining not covered by the contract and, therefore, subject to the duty to
bargain during the life of that agreement, absent an appropriate manage-
ment-rights clause or a zipper clause. The Board has not fully appreci-
ated this distinction.
With regard to the individual discrimination cases, the Board has
vacillated over the years. There have been several three-to-two decisions
overruling one another, the current position of the Board being that it
will defer to the grievance and arbitration process with regard to individ-
ual claims as well as with regard to refusal-to-bargain cases.43
This approach to individual claims is more troubling. A strong ar-
gument can be made that an individual employee has a statutory right to
invoke the processes of the National Labor Relations Board and file her
own section 8(a)(3) charge, and that the grievance and arbitration proce-
dures of the collective bargaining agreement should provide only an al-
ternative, supplementary remedy and not a basis for preventing the
individual from going to the Board.
It is heartening to see that at least some of the courts have indicated
that there must be scrupulous attention paid to whether there is a conflict
of interest between the union and the employee in those situations. If
any such conflict exists, the employee should not be precluded from hav-
ing direct access to the Board.
CONCLUSION
There is a distinction between contract rights and statutory rights
which must be always kept in mind in this area of law. Ordinarily, the
43. The Collyer doctrine was extended to § 8(a)(3) discrimination cases in National Radio Co.,
198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). National Radio was overruled in General American Transportation Co.,
228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), which in turn was overruled in United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B.
557 (1984), which revitalized the National Radio doctrine favoring deferral in § 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3),
8(b)(l)(A), and 8(b)(2) cases.
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fundamental function of the arbitrator is to interpret and enforce con-
tract rights, and, ordinarily, the fundamental function of administrative
agencies like the NLRB and the courts is to interpret and enforce statu-
tory rights. If this distinction is understood and maintained, defining the
role of external law in arbitration will cease to be a difficult process.
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